By Samir Chopra
“An terribly stable synthesis from an grand variety of philosophical, felony, and technological resources . . . the publication will attract felony lecturers and scholars, legal professionals all for e-commerce and our on-line world criminal matters, technologists, ethical philosophers, and clever lay readers drawn to excessive tech concerns, privateness, [and] robotics.”—Kevin Ashley, collage of Pittsburgh tuition of legislations As agencies and executive firms exchange human staff with on-line customer support and automatic mobile structures, we develop into conversant in doing company with nonhuman brokers. If man made intelligence (AI) know-how advances as today’s prime researchers expect, those brokers may well quickly functionality with such constrained human enter that they seem to behave independently. after they in attaining that point of autonomy, what criminal prestige may still they've got? Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White current a gently reasoned dialogue of the way present philosophy and felony concept can accommodate more and more refined AI expertise. Arguing for the felony personhood of a man-made agent, the authors speak about what it capacity to claim it has “knowledge” and the facility to make your mind up. they think about key questions reminiscent of who needs to take accountability for an agent’s activities, whom the agent serves, and even if it might face a clash of curiosity.
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Additional resources for A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents
Applying agency law to arti‹cial agents brings in its wake the doctrine of attributed knowledge, by which knowledge gained by an agent is attributed to the principal for various purposes. The topic of attribution of knowledge requires a discussion of some foundational and philosophical notions: When can we say that an arti‹cial agent knows something? , the human being or corporation on behalf of whom the agent is operating)? We devise a pragmatic, capacity-based analysis of knowledge attribution for arti‹cial agents that extends traditional philosophical analysis in a manner appropriate for the case of arti‹cial agents, and is framed in a manner suitable for use in legal attributions of knowledge to arti‹cial agents.
Such a treatment is the most coherent way to ‹t them into existing legal schemas without extensive doctrinal change. There are prima facie motivations for such an approach. We use programs and systems as our agents; they work for us and on our behalf. The positions these systems occupy have been occupied by legal agents of similarly placed principals in the past. com’s website agent would once have been accomplished by an army of sales clerks. Such automation does not mask the fact a similar range of responsibilities has been delegated to an entity of comparable competence in the ‹eld in question.
36 Here the interpretation of the arti‹cial agents as bound by its obligations has descended to the level of the internal architecture, but such investigation might not be necessary if the agent visibly manifests its conformance with such obligations and is interpretable as such by adopting the intentional stance toward it. ” The embodiment and execution of ‹duciary duties could be operationalized in other ways. An arti‹cial agent, intended for ‹nancial portfolio management, could be programmed “to act solely in the user’s interests, as de‹ned by portfolio risk, return and asset allocation parameters.